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OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS

BRIEFING PAPER
1956

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Introduction

The past year can be characterized as a year of crises and change within the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It was marked by conflict with the leadership in Communist Poland, by revolution in Hungary, and by widespread unrest. The impact of the Polish and Hungarian developments spread over the entire Sino-Soviet Bloc and was clearly a factor in the general revision of economic targets and economic programs. Poland completely reorganized its economic program and its planning and control procedures. As of the end of 1956, the situation in Hungary continued sufficiently chaotic to preclude the development of any new economic programs.

The forces at work in the Satellites combined with the ambitious objectives of the Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan required almost complete re-vamping of 1957 economic plans and made probable a revision of the entire Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60). Leaders of the Chinese Communist Party were convened in October to review its achievements under the First Five-Year Plan and noted major imbalances in Chinese economic development while outlining their program for the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62). Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal and the ensuing developments in the Middle East which resulted in the blockage of the Suez Canal further added to these strained economic conditions in the Bloc.

Despite these economic problems, however, the USSR and other Communist states continued their expansion during 1956 of credit for arms and long-run economic development to the underdeveloped countries of the Free World. There appears to be no reduction in this program in the immediate future, with the exception of delays in the implementation of aid

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agreements with Yugoslavia which results from current political relations between the two countries.

Geographic as well as economic realities have influenced recent developments in the Soviet Bloc. We note, for example, that the ballyhooed "New Lands" Program in agriculture attempts to enlarge the Soviet food supply by an organized exploitation of steppe lands comparable to the wheat-producing high plains of western Canada and the United States. In Egypt, we have seen ostensible Soviet support of the Aswan Dam which makes the fullest propaganda use of Egypt's pressing need for the enlargement of Nile Valley resources. Throughout the Middle East, South and East Asia, and the European Satellites, the activities of the Soviet Union have reflected a keen awareness of the factors of strategic location and resources as they serve Soviet ends and those of the Free World.

In this period of strain and change within the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it is essential that U.S. policy planners be provided with timely and accurate interpretations of current economic activities and problems of the Bloc, as well as the best possible evaluation of its long-term capabilities and plans. Our Office of Research and Reports provides the factual analyses required to anticipate and prepare for major economic problems which stem from the rapid progression of events within the Sino-Soviet Bloc and which may affect the long-range power balance in the world. In describing the work of this Office, I shall mention in addition to its economic and geographic intelligence production some other important activities which include its coordinating responsibility and its intelligence support to economic defense.

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Economic Intelligence

The various problems of the Sino-Soviet Bloc economies are so complex and closely interrelated that its many parts can properly be measured only by applying an integrated approach in the research effort. Assessment of the real problems affecting Soviet economic growth requires an attack on an overall basis. Other components of the intelligence community are not equipped, and are not charged, with this overall approach to the study of the economies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc; their economic research efforts are understandably oriented toward their individual departmental interests. By interagency agreement, the primary responsibility for economic research on the Sino-Soviet Bloc now rests squarely on the Office of Research and Reports.

To carry out this responsibility, the intelligence effort must be directed at all levels of the economy and in varying degrees of intensity. With respect to recent political and economic disruptions in the European Satellites, attention has been focused on the stability and cohesion of the Satellite and Soviet economies and on the impact, which is already being felt, of the reorientation of international trade within the Soviet Bloc and between the European Satellites and the Free World. Our analyses have emphasized the exploration of factors which may lead to some loosening of Soviet control over individual Satellites, while simultaneously evaluating the extent to which the USSR will be

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called upon to invest additional money and materials in the area.

In recognition, and indeed anticipation, of some of the developments which took place in 1956, this Office had regrouped its strength to deal rapidly with the economic developments taking place in the Eastern European Satellite countries. Well before the latest crises in Poland and Hungary, we had increased the strength of our European Satellites research effort. This action was promptly justified by events and, as a result, U.S. policy planners were quickly provided with detailed information on the economic implications of the recent changes in Eastern Europe and with estimates of related Soviet requirements for the support of their control over this area.

It should also be mentioned that this Office has continued to expand and intensify its economic research on Communist China. We are engaged in a program of complementary and interlocking research projects dealing with the Chinese economy. This program includes the study and evaluation of the Chinese potential for industrial growth, and an evaluation of all available information on the remarkably heavy dependence of the Chinese Communists on the technical assistance, plant equipment, and other capital goods being furnished by the Soviet Union and the European Satellites. Indications of cutbacks in Chinese Communist plan goals are also under rigorous scrutiny.

Analysis of possible large-scale reductions in the objectives of the Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan has been directed at an evaluation of

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the significance of the apparent Soviet failure to maintain past rates of economic growth and an assessment of the prospects for revisions in basic Soviet economic policy. I might say parenthetically that our Office of Research and Reports, within a matter of hours of the receipt by radio of the draft revisions of the 1957 Plan, had placed in the hands of the policymakers an accurate picture of the salient features of these revisions and their effect on the major economic objectives which the Soviets have set for themselves.

In the past two years, the NATO organization has shown increased concern with this problem of Soviet economic expansion in its efforts to appraise the East-West power balance. This Office participated in providing support to NATO in estimating long-term trends in economic growth and capabilities of the Sino-Soviet Bloc as compared with trends in the Free World.

How are these problems of the Soviet Bloc economy analyzed, and how are the answers obtained through an integrated and coordinated approach? The Office undertakes intensive analysis of fragmentary and conflicting data obtained overtly and covertly from innumerable sources, and from these bits and pieces develops the economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc required both in production of National Intelligence Estimates and in a variety of special studies in response to high priority requests. Further, it provides guidance

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to the collection activities of CIA and other agencies. The complexity of the job demands the welding together of all the various skills brought into the organization. The economist, the technical expert, the country and language specialist, all are vital parts of the research team. All need special additional training, which is expensive and time consuming, but absolutely necessary.


Attention is being given to the development of new techniques of analysis in order to make maximum use of the factual information which is constantly flowing into the Office. Pursuing the successful analytical approach developed in the past year or two for making cost estimates of Soviet military programs, an effort is now being made to extend this price and cost analysis to our estimates of present and future Soviet atomic energy development. These costs will be checked against the capability of the Soviet economy to provide for the facilities and new investments indicated. These analyses take the form of rigorous inspection of Soviet cost and price relationships as an important step toward the determination of the principal areas of Soviet industrial strength and weakness. It is anticipated that the results of these studies may make it possible for us to forecast production trends in the Soviet domestic economy and, equally important, to forecast the composition and direction of Soviet goods which may move into world trade in competition with U.S. and other Western production in Free World countries.


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Concurrently with its comprehensive economic research, the Office of Research and Reports evaluates and interprets current economic developments within the Bloc countries and in their relation to the Free World. A special staff, working in close cooperation with the Office of Current Intelligence and supported by appropriate research components, prepares timely reports of these developments for inclusion in the Agency's output of current intelligence. The same mechanism is used in marshalling the full support of this Office behind the National Indications Center and the IAC Watch Committee.

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Each of our economic research components periodically calls upon a small panel of cleared consultants drawn from among top executives in American industry. Through these panels, we obtain an excellent independent check on the soundness of our estimates and advice on ways to simplify or economize in our research procedures.

The annual economic research program of the Office, aimed as it is at serving many different interests and purposes, is necessarily complex. Past experience, now analyzed quantitatively through the use of IBM methods, is depended on heavily in the development of revised and new programs. Particular attention is given to the Priority National Intelligence Objectives and to such advice as our principal consumers are able to give concerning their requirements in the months to come. Formulation of the program begins with full provision for support to the production of schedules and anticipated National Intelligence Estimates. Provision must also be made for scheduled contributions to the National Intelligence Surveys, where this Office has the responsibility for economic sections dealing with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Similarly, certain aspects of our work in support of other agencies can be scheduled in response to community-wide deficiencies in economic intelligence as identified by the Economic Intelligence Committee. In addition, we are aware from experience that a substantial portion of our research time will have to be spent in meeting "crash" or emergency requests from various high-level consumers.

It is in this manner that the Office of Research and Reports provides the necessary intelligence on economic activities and trends of the countries within the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

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Geographic Intelligence

We maintain within our Office of Research and Reports a group of competent geographic analysts and photo intelligence specialists who provide research and technical support to all parts of the Agency, and contribute substantially to the National Intelligence Surveys Program.

A major part of the work of the geographic group, mostly in the form of geographic intelligence reports and maps, is undertaken in direct support of operations planning and field activities, either of the Agency or the Armed Services. On the accuracy of this effort depends the lives of individuals who are either to be rescued from hostile territory or put into hostile territory to accomplish operational missions. For instance, during the initial period of increased activity in the Middle East area last year, Air Force crew members in Libya and Morocco were briefed from special geographic reports prepared by this Office on how to evade or escape should USAF planes crash land behind enemy lines. There have been several reports from the field to the effect that lives have been saved because of the accuracy of these and similar briefing materials. Another type of report prepared by this group is the map and textual analysis of important operational targets and safe approaches to them. Still other studies deal with the distribution, characteristics and attitudes of minority groups living within the boundaries of the Bloc. These are used for operational and psychological warfare purposes.

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During the past year, current geographic intelligence reports on Antarctica and on the USSR operations in the Antarctic have been produced and include maps of the area published for the first time. These were done to guide United States and Allied policymakers in the determination of United States interests and the planning and execution of "Operation Deepfreeze." More recently reports of USSR submarine base construction in Antarctica have required geographic intelligence support for the preparation of a Special Estimate of Soviet capabilities and intentions with respect to the establishment of a permanent military base and the possibility of future political claims.

Reconnaissance and photographic intelligence continue to increase in national intelligence interest and are now more important to the United States by many orders of magnitude than ever before. The scope and degree of our intelligence dependence upon information obtained from aerial photography is clearly indicated by the paramount position suggested for it by the President in his Summit proposal to the USSR for mutual air inspection. Currently, the increasing volume of aerial and ground photography, which is being obtained by United States forces on a global basis, continues to provide detailed answers to questions regarding Communist capabilities in potential areas of operations. CIA, in increasingly closer cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Army, continues to expand its utilization of this

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growing volume of photography to assist in the preparation of current intelligence reports, national estimates, and research studies.

For example, current photographic intelligence analyses continue to yield significant details of Communist Chinese activities in areas bordering the Taiwan Straits. These analyses are undertaken in direct support of the IAC Watch Committee. Study of Soviet developments in the field of guided missiles has been aided by ground photography.

As a result of the increasing volume of reconnaissance photography being received in the United States and the intensified demands within CIA for comprehensive utilization of it, the capacity of the CIA photographic intelligence has been expanded substantially.

Experience has shown that one of the most effective ways of presenting intelligence is to make extensive use of specially constructed maps. Our cartographic unit within the Office plans and prepares these intelligence maps for inclusion in CIA reports, National Intelligence Estimates, National Intelligence Surveys, and for many other purposes including covert planning and operations.

An extensive map library and map reference facility is also maintained for use by all authorized Government officials. Its specialized collection of foreign maps is kept current through a coordinated and highly effective interagency map procurement program that reflects the requirements of the several Government agencies

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having need for foreign maps and minimizes the possibility of duplicative collection efforts.

Interagency Coordination

In carrying out CIA's responsibilities for coordinating economic intelligence of interest to our national security, as directed by the National Security Council, the Office of Research and Reports plays an active role in the work of the interagency Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC), established in 1951 under CIA chairmanship. This Committee includes representatives from the IAC agencies which produce economic intelligence, i.e., the Department of State, the three Armed Services, the Joint Staff (JCS), and CIA, and has associate members from such non-IAC agencies as Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and the International Cooperation Administration. Our Office of Research and Reports provides secretariat services for the main Committee and for 13 subcommittees, as well as for a number of standing and ad hoc working groups.

Among the principal responsibilities of the EIC is the production of agreed interagency reports on selected economic intelligence issues of major importance. For example, Biweekly and periodic Summary reports on Sino-Soviet Bloc Economic Penetration Efforts in Free World Underdeveloped Areas are widely distributed to key U.S. Government officials and offices, including principal overseas posts. These reports have also been made available to the Senate Foreign Relations


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and House Foreign Affairs Committees. As another example, periodic coordinated reports have also been published on the size and composition of Communist China's foreign trade. This has been a principal reference work within the Government on such questions as Communist China's dependence on imports from Bloc and non-Bloc sources.

The EIC systematically reviews the economic intelligence effort within the U.S. Government to assist in identifying priority deficiencies in research and collection and in avoiding unnecessary duplication of research by the individual agencies. One example of the means by which duplication in research programing is reduced is the survey listings of the EIC which periodically report the status of all internal and external (contractual) U.S. Government economic research on the Sino-Soviet Bloc and on Free World underdeveloped areas involved in Bloc economic penetration efforts. Moreover, proposals for U.S. Government external economic research amounting to \$5,000 or more are reviewed by the EIC. Through this Committee mechanism, the Office of Research and Reports, as the organization primarily responsible for providing intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc economies, obtains guidance in the continuing re-examination of its own research program.

Continued efforts are directed by the EIC toward improved coordination of collection requirements. Through such activities as the

 Economic Reporting Guidance Programs systematic

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guidance is provided to officials reporting and traveling within Bloc countries.

CIA also produces and coordinates intelligence in support of the U.S. economic defense program. The Office of Research and Reports represents CIA on the Economic Defense Advisory Committee (EDAC) and chairs the interagency Economic Defense Intelligence Committee (EDIC) established under it. In this way, not only the knowledge and competence of the Office of Research and Reports and of other parts of the Agency, but also of other intelligence agencies, is provided in support of economic defense activities. For example, EDIC has on occasions undertaken to draw on the scientific expertise within the U.S. Government for the systematic identification of commodities which have substantially increased in strategic importance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc because of recent scientific and technological developments.

Under the NSC directive on economic defense which emphasizes enforcement of controls, CIA has responsibility for providing action agencies with the intelligence on illegal transactions and other efforts to circumvent controls. As part of this support, ORR maintains intelligence on foreign firms and individuals engaged in transactions detrimental to Free World security. This extensive file of information not only assists the current enforcement effort but would be invaluable in the event of war.

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The staff coordinating and otherwise providing this intelligence support by CIA in the field of economic defense has been reduced to a minimum level adequate to handle the changing priority demands of the program.

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ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES HIGHLIGHTING ORR ACTIVITIES IN 1956

1. Possible Soviet Guided Missile Testing Ranges

Priority attention has been given to Soviet progress in guided missile development. On the basis of a given set of known parameters governing experimental guided missile operations, the entire area of the Soviet Union is being analyzed to determine which areas have the proper combination of geographical elements--such as surface configuration, climate, water, settlement patterns, transportation facilities--required for the physical location of ICBM and IRBM ranges. The conclusions from these studies are submitted in support of intelligence on the Soviet guided missile research and development program, serving as guidance for the continued surveillance of Soviet activities in this field by the intelligence community.

2. Intelligence Support for Collection Activities

Due to the obsolescence or complete lack of city plans and street guides for many centers in the Soviet Union, military attaches and other collection personnel have been seriously handicapped in their mission. At the request of ONI, USAF, and collection organs within the CIA, detailed city plans are prepared which specifically assist the field collector. Maps of Moscow, Leningrad, and several Satellite cities have not only enabled the service attaches and other personnel to find their way, but have helped in locating Soviet activities of

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intelligence interest. Returning personnel state that these city plans have been of extreme value as an aid to their own activities and as an item to barter with friendly diplomatic missions in the Soviet Bloc.

3. Civil Defense in the USSR

The first basic study of civil defense in the USSR was completed in 1956 and represents the only comprehensive analysis of the Soviet civil defense program available throughout the intelligence community. The report has been of particular value to the Federal Civil Defense Agency and has been called to the attention of the National Security Council by the Director of Central Intelligence.

Our research has demonstrated that the USSR has been developing an extensive and costly civil defense system throughout the USSR and has also promoted civil defense preparations in the European Satellites. This campaign has included the training of millions of people in civil defense activities and a widespread program of shelter construction. Soviet civil defense preparations reached a high level of activity in 1955 and 1956, and have been increasingly oriented since 1954 toward defense against nuclear and biological warfare. Analysis of the Soviet program has revealed an expenditure of effort in Soviet civil defense training and protective construction many times larger than that of the United States.

4. ORR Contribution to the Nuclear Energy Estimates

During the last year, ORR was asked by the Joint Atomic Energy

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Intelligence Committee to contribute to the current estimate on Soviet capabilities in the nuclear energy field (NIE 11-2-57). After some delay in necessary clearance procedures and training, ORR initiated a crash program to implement this request. In a period of only six weeks, significant contributions were made to this estimate in the fields of:

- a. key raw materials available for the Soviet nuclear energy program;
- b. budget allocations to the investment portion of the Soviet nuclear energy program; and
- c. economic considerations which affect the production characteristics internal to the program.

These contributions were of immediate use, and also constituted a promising beginning of a longer range research program aimed at narrowing the range of uncertainty in the Committee's estimate of the size of the Soviet atomic energy program.

5. Economic Support to the Estimate of Soviet Guided Missiles Program

As part of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-5-57) on current and projected Soviet guided missile programs, ORR undertook a series of detailed costing studies of various possible programs projected forward to 1966. The purpose of these studies was to present the economic implications of these alternative programs with respect to their overall size and internal composition. These contributions were

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useful in bringing the estimated size of the program into more realistic bounds and in adjusting the magnitude of the component guided missiles programs within the estimated overall program. They also pointed to possible strains on the electronics industries of the USSR due to the guided missiles program, highlighting a possibly vulnerable sector of the Soviet economy needing further examination. These studies also related the guided missiles program to the overall military expenditures of the USSR and demonstrated its probable impact on the national economy as well as on the Soviet defense budget.

6. Structure of the Soviet Economy

The recently completed ORR report on management of the Soviet industrial enterprise is the first exhaustive intelligence study on this topic, and is already proving extremely useful in evaluating complex organizational realignments in the Soviet economic structure. The February 14, 1957 decree of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party provides for changes which will result in a significant measure of basic decentralization of economic administration in the Soviet Union. This new measure represents a move away from highly centralized control by All-Union ministries and appears to assign more authority to regional economic areas. The timing of the decree suggests that the economic difficulties leading to lower production goals in the 1957 Plan and a review of the Sixth Five-Year Plan resulted, in part at least, from inefficient forms of economic administration. Future study

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of the implementation of this decree will be greatly assisted by the recent ORR paper on industrial management and by another study, soon to be published, dealing with the Soviet planning process.

7. Population Trends in the USSR

A key factor in the ability of the USSR to carry out its long-range economic development plans will be the size, composition, and distribution of its population, particularly the labor force. Because of its direct bearing on Soviet capabilities, reliable demographic information on the USSR is in constant demand and of critical importance. A significant contribution on this subject was contained in a recent ORR report which indicated that Soviet fertility had decreased by about 20 percent from 1940 to 1955. In sharp contrast, U.S. population fertility had increased by roughly 40-50 percent in the same period. Because the Soviet economy depends heavily on a rapidly expanding labor force, the declining Soviet fertility rate will have a significant impact on the USSR's ambitious plans for rapid economic expansion. During the period of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60), for instance, the increase in the Soviet labor force [population between the ages of 15 and 59] will be only about 40 percent of the increase during the preceding Five-Year Plan period. During the next 20 years, moreover, the Soviet advantage over the U.S. in numbers of males of prime military age (20-30 years) will probably decline from over 7 million to only about 3 million.

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8. The New Lands Program of the USSR

A basic economic problem confronting the USSR is the necessity of expanding agricultural production. Prior to 1954, when the so-called New Lands Program was started in order to put under cultivation vast acreages in western Siberia and Kazakhstan, the USSR's postwar production of food and fodder grains had not yet been restored to the 1937 level. ORR undertook detailed economic and geographic research studies to determine whether the widely publicized New Lands Program would make a significant contribution to solution of the Soviet agricultural problem. These studies have greatly advanced our knowledge of Soviet agricultural prospects and have enabled us to predict with greater certainty that present Five-Year Plan goals for agriculture will not be attained.

9. Communist China's Trade and Transport

During 1956, we completed the sixth annual report on Communist China's foreign trade activities, a major target of U.S. intelligence organizations. This study is particularly valuable to U.S. policymakers in assessing the volume and types of commodities moving into Communist China and the extent of China's dependence on foreign trade with the rest of the Bloc. Another important aspect of this study has been the work performed on the transportation elements of China's foreign trade, particularly with respect to shipments over the Trans-Siberian Railroad (see example 10). Intelligence representatives from

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the Armed Services and the Department of State have recently reiterated that this is an essential analytical reference work not only for policy formulation in Washington, but also for U.S. officials at foreign posts and field commands.

10. The Trans-Siberian Railroad

One of the three major reports published recently by ORR on transportation in the USSR was an exhaustive analysis of the traffic carried on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. This railroad is of vital economic importance not only to the USSR but also in supporting the Bloc-wide program of economic assistance to Communist China. ORR's research resulted in the first intelligence report to provide an analysis of the economic significance of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, based on a detailed examination of the volume and character of the traffic actually carried on the line. In techniques and methods of analysis of a difficult problem, it is a noteworthy pioneering effort which will be of great value to the intelligence community.

11. Sino-Soviet Economic Activities in Underdeveloped Areas

The continuation throughout 1956 of the aid and trade offensive of the USSR, the European Satellites, and Communist China in the underdeveloped areas of the world has been of particular concern to U.S. policymakers and has fully justified our decision, reported a year ago, to pull together within ORR a small group of highly qualified specialists to maintain close and systematic surveillance of Bloc activities in this

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field. The results of the research of this group to date have been published in 27 biweekly and 3 summary analytical reports of the Economic Intelligence Committee, and have also been incorporated in several National Intelligence Estimates. These series report on specific Sino-Soviet Bloc activities relating to economic penetration of Free World areas and periodically provide estimates of Bloc economic capabilities in this field. The reports have been published in response to specific needs of U.S. policy officials concerned with countering the economic offensive of the Bloc and have been most favorably received by all recipients, including the Under Secretary of State and the Chairman of the President's Council on Foreign Economic Policy.

12. Intelligence Support on Exchange Proposals

During 1956, the IAC Standing Committee on Exchanges called on ORR and the EIC subcommittees to provide technical advice and suggestions in connection with proposed visits of Bloc engineers and technicians to the U.S. in exchange for visits of similar U.S. personnel to the Bloc. Altogether, ORR contributed some 32 separate reports covering exchanges in such fields as electronics, telecommunications, agriculture, petroleum, and shipbuilding. Among other topics, these papers considered the net intelligence advantage to be derived from the proposed exchanges.

Since the period of Soviet repressions in Hungary and the consequent interruption of U.S.-Soviet exchanges, the intelligence effort has been increasingly concentrated on possible exchanges with the Eastern European Satellites.

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1956 PLAUDITS

1. From Chief, Intelligence Liaison Staff, Operations Coordinating Board to AD/RR, 28 December 1956, expressing appreciation for the receipt of a current ORR analysis of Soviet Satellite economic structure which should prove very useful for the planners and operators. The writer requested future receipt of similar studies for the use of the OCB and NSC staffs. (CONFIDENTIAL)
2. From The Commandant, The National War College to the DAD/RR, 10 December 1956 wherein appreciation is expressed for the DAD/RR's organization and leadership of a panel discussion on Soviet Economic Weaknesses. Both the DAD/RR and his ORR associates were complimented for their penetrating analysis of that subject. (UNCLASSIFIED)
3. From Clarence B. Randall, Special Assistant to the President to DCI, 30 July 1956, in which he thanks the DCI for his offer of cooperation and for the excellent briefing on the economic problems affecting the Communist Bloc presented to him by the DD/I, AD/RR, and Ch/C. (UNCLASSIFIED)
4. From Counselor of Embassy, American Embassy, Paris, 25 June 1956, to AD/RR acknowledging receipt of an ORR geographic study on the geographic and demographic implications of partition as a possible solution to the Algerian problem. This officer stated that the Ambassador would be very pleased to receive this study which agrees with the conclusions of knowledgeable French sources. (SECRET)
5. From Chief of Transportation, US Army to DCI, 2 April 1956, expressing the appreciation of his office for the outstanding assistance of the Cartography Division which was rendered during the past two years. General Paul F. Yount stated that the staff of the Cartography Division has made valuable contributions to the overall intelligence effort of the Transportation Corps. (UNCLASSIFIED)
6. From the Planning Staff, Federal Civil Defense Administration to the AD/RR expressing the appreciation of Mr. Peterson, Federal Civil Defense Administrator, for the very valuable briefing on the status of USSR Civil Defense Programs. (SECRET)

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7. From Deputy Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces to DCI, 21 March 1956, thanking the DCI for the participation of representatives of ORR in seminars conducted by that College. These named representatives were excellent panel members and the students derived considerable benefit from their contributions. (UNCLASSIFIED)
8. From Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, to DCI, 20 March 1956. In this Letter of Appreciation the Deputy Director expressed deep gratitude for the participation of an ORR representative (and others) in a NATO intelligence conference. The writer commented upon the labor and knowledge necessary for successful representation at this conference and concludes that their effective negotiations were made possible by their comprehensive understanding of the subject under consideration. (UNCLASSIFIED)
9. From the Taiwan Defense Command to the AD/RR reporting the excellence and usefulness of an ORR study on Chinese Communist military construction and logistic activity in the East China/Taiwan Straits Area. (SECRET)

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ORR PRODUCTION
and
COORDINATED EIC REPORTS AND SURVEYS
1 January - 31 December 1956

Table 1. Reports Completed

| Category | Economic | Geographic | Coordination | Total |
|---------------------|----------|------------|--------------|-------|
| CIA/RR | 20 | | | 20 |
| CIA/SC/RR | 31 | | | 31 |
| PR | 25 | | | 25 |
| IM | 24 | | | 24 |
| RA | 6 | | | 6 |
| MCB | 12 | | | 12 |
| SC/RA | 1 | | | 1 |
| (FM)RA | 12 | | | 12 |
| MP | 22 | | | 22 |
| SC/MP | 3 | | | 3 |
| IP | 77 | | | 77 |
| SC/IP | 22 | | | 22 |
| CSM | 82 | | | 82 |
| NIS Secs. | 16 | 45 | | 61 |
| G | | 2 | | 2 |
| MR | | 3 | | 3 |
| GR | | 33 | | 33 |
| G/E | | 27 | | 27 |
| G/I | | 36 | | 36 |
| G/S | | 9 | | 9 |
| GP/I | | 87 | | 87 |
| GM | | 2 | | 2 |
| EIC-R | | | 4 | 4 |
| EIC-SR | | | 3 | 3 |
| EIC-S | | | 5 | 5 |
| EIC-WGR | 23 | | | 23 |
| Econ. Def. Projects | 31 | | 6 | 37 |
| TOTALS | 407 | 244 | 18 | 669 |

Table 2. Maps Completed

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Table 3. Projects in Progress

| | <u>Economic</u> | <u>Geographic</u> | <u>Coordination</u> |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| In Reproduction | 8 | 4 | 2 |
| Editorial Review | 10 | 6 | 4 |
| In Preparation for Reproduction | 9 | 4 | - |
| In Division for Revision | 6 | 5 | - |
| Projects Scheduled: | | | |
| Research in Progress | 192 | 65 | 17 |
| Research Pending | - | 57 | - |
| TOTALS | 225 | 141 | 23 |

Table 4. Maps in Progress

| | <u>Geographic</u> |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| In Reproduction | 30 |
| In Proof | 145 |
| In Progress | <u>200</u> |
| TOTAL | 375 |

~~SECRET~~